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Abstract This study examines whether Seguro Popular, a free-of-charge publicly
provided health insurance program for otherwise uninsured households, crowded-
out private transfers in Mexico. Using data from the National Household Income
and Expenditure Survey, the effects of Seguro Popular are identified using the
spatial variation in the program’s coverage induced by its sequential roll-out
throughout Mexico. The results show that Seguro Popular reduced on average a
household’s probability of receiving private transfers by 5.55 % points. This finding
appears to be driven by domestic private transfers, since the program’s effects are
only statistically significant for private transfers originating within Mexico. In
addition, Seguro Popular had a weak and not statistically significant negative effect
on the amount of private transfers received. Failure to take into account possible
changes in private behaviour induced by Seguro Popular may overstate the pro-
gram’s potential benefits or distributional impacts.
Keywords Public health insurance  Crowding-out  Private transfers  Mexico 
Seguro Popular
JEL Classification I13  I18  I38
1 Introduction
A number of developing countries have implemented social assistance programs
with the purpose of benefiting the population located in the lower tail of the income
distribution. Understanding the impact of these programs and how they compare to
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other public policies is central to the development process. This issue is especially
salient in Mexico, a country with a per capita income approximately one-third of the
U.S. and a high degree of income inequality, characterised by being at the forefront
in putting into effect large public assistance programs whose objective is to increase
its population’s human development levels. Given that such policies are often
overlaid on top of pre-existing private support networks, various studies have
analysed whether public assistance programs displace or crowd-out private transfers
(e.g. Cox and Jimenez 1992; Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1994; Attanasio and Rı´os-
Rull 2000; Jensen 2003). The present study contributes to this literature by
examining whether the introduction of Seguro Popular, a free-of-charge publicly
provided health insurance program for informal sector workers, crowded-out private
transfers in Mexico.1
Seguro Popular covers the costs of 284 unique health care interventions and more
than 300 medicines comprising 95.0 % of Mexico’s total disease burden (King et al.
2009). For more than 52 million people, Seguro Popular offers a generous means of
support since it functions as a source of protection against catastrophic health
expenditures, and provides a safety net to many of the country’s most vulnerable
households. The program has been studied at length by researchers, who have
mostly focused on its impact on health expenditures, health outcomes and sector of
employment (e.g. King et al. 2009; Barros 2009; Gala´rraga et al. 2010; Barofsky
2011; Sosa-Rubı´ et al. 2009; Azuara and Marinescu 2013). The reduction in health
expenditures derived from being affiliated in Seguro Popular may be large enough
to influence the receipt of private transfers.2
If households receive private transfers to alleviate budget constraints, it might be
expected that those enrolled in Seguro Popular receive fewer private transfers or
stop receiving them altogether, since being affiliated to the program is likely to
reduce health expenditures and help alleviate budget constraints by increasing
disposable income. Alternatively, if private transfers are not a result of budget
constraints or are used for other purposes unrelated to health expenditures, then
private transfers might not be affected by enrolment in Seguro Popular. As a result,
it is an empirical question whether and to what extent expenses not incurred in
resulting from being affiliated to Seguro Popular affect the receipt of private
transfers. If the program crowds-out private support, then the study is relevant for
policy makers who must take into account this unintended effect of Seguro Popular,
since some of the program’s goals might have been partially hampered.
1 An individual is considered uninsured or an informal sector worker if she or he is not registered with
one of Mexico’s public social security institutions. According to census data, in 2010 the number of
individuals eligible for Seguro Popular equalled 63.2 million or 56.5 % of Mexico’s population.
2 Among the studies that have examined the impact of Seguro Popular on health expenditures, King et al.
(2009) using an intent to treat approach observe in treated localities a 23.0 % decrease in catastrophic
health expenditures compared to a 8.4 % decrease in control localities. Barros (2009) finds that Seguro
Popular reduces both the likelihood of having a positive expenditure on primary health care as well the
size of the primary health care expenditures households incur in. Gala´rraga et al. (2010) observe that
households insured with Seguro Popular spent 171 pesos less on outpatient services and 360 pesos less on
medicines per year relative to non-enrolled households. Finally, Barofsky (2011) finds that the
introduction of Seguro Popular generated a 28.0 % reduction in out-of-pocket health spending among
households located in the top quartile of the health expenditure distribution.
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The choice to remit is typically preceded by the decision to migrate. Individuals
migrate due to a variety of reasons related to income maximisation, minimising
risks to family income, or overcoming capital constraints, among others. Prior to the
implementation of Seguro Popular, vulnerable households commonly encountered
out-of-pocket and catastrophic health expenditures attributed to outpatient care and
medication, constraining them to reduce expenses in food, shelter, or education
(Gala´rraga et al. 2010). Migrating and subsequently remitting represented a
plausible alternative to overcome these difficulties.
Although declining in recent years, international private transfers represent a
significant source of income for Mexican households, accounting for 1.8 % of
Mexico’s gross domestic product (GDP) in 2012.3 According to information from
the Mexican Migration Project (MMP) 143, Mexican migrants residing in the U.S.
commonly claim that one of their main motives for remitting is to cover health
expenditures in Mexico. Specifically, when asked to report up to five reasons why
they send private transfers to family members left behind, 39.2 % of respondents
state as one of their reasons that they send money to Mexico to cover health
expenses. This category is only surpassed by food and maintenance, which is
claimed to be one of the motives for remitting for 41.8 % of the U.S.-based
remitters included in the MMP. On the contrary, education expenses are only
reported as one of the reasons for remitting 12.1 % of the time. Consequently,
various studies have analysed the relationship between private transfers and health
expenditures, generally finding a positive correlation among the two variables (e.g.
Airola 2007; Valero-Gil 2008; Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo 2011).4
Given the significant segment of the population that Seguro Popular aimed to
cover, the program was expanded gradually throughout Mexico. The variation in
Seguro Popular’s availability and intensity over time and space allows to identify its
causal effects, where differences between regions permit circumventing issues of
selection into treatment among the uninsured population. While the expansion of
Seguro Popular was not completely random, several studies have relied on the
timing and rate of the program’s implementation to identify its impact on different
outcomes (Bosch et al. 2012).
To date, evidence on the impact of Seguro Popular on private transfers is non-
existent, as the literature on Mexico has focused on whether social assistance
programs such as Prospera, previously called Progresa and Oportunidades, or 70 y
Ma´s, both of which include a cash transfer component, crowd-out private support
(e.g. Attanasio and Rı´os-Rull 2000; Albarran and Attanasio 2003; Amuedo-
Dorantes and Juarez 2015). The related international literature is limited to the study
3 At the household level, in 2000 the sum of domestic and international private transfers represented on
average 5.0 % of total household income. Among households receiving a positive amount of private
transfers, they accounted for 32.0 % of their total income.
4 Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2011) find that a 100 pesos increase in private transfer income is
associated with a 6 pesos increase in health expenditures. In contrast, for other sources of income, a 100
pesos increase is associated with a 2 pesos increase in health expenses. Valero-Gil (2008) estimates that
approximately 10.0 % of private transfer income is spent on health care. Moreover, the author observes
that while only 2.0 % of households covered by social security institutions receive private transfers,
7.3 % of non-covered households receive private transfers. Finally, Airola (2007) observes that private
transfer income is associated with a 44.0 % rise in the consumption share of health care.
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by Klohn and Strupat (2013), who investigate whether informal transfers in Ghana
were affected by the introduction of a nationwide health insurance scheme. The
scholars observe that the policy affected the likelihood of making or receiving
informal transfers and their monetary equivalents.
The results show that among households eligible for the program, a 1.0 %
increase in the Seguro Popular coverage rate reduced the probability of receiving
private transfers by 0.0555 % points. This finding appears to be driven by domestic
private transfers, since the program’s effect is statistically significant for private
transfers originating within Mexico, but is not significant for private transfers sent
by foreign-based migrants. Moreover, the results show that Seguro Popular had a
weak and non-significant negative effect on the amount of private transfers
received. The study suggests that an unintended consequence of Seguro Popular is
that the program partially crowds-out private transfers by reducing the likelihood of
receiving them.
The study proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the motives for remitting and
how Seguro Popular may affect private transfers. Section 3 provides background
information on the social security system in Mexico and Seguro Popular. Section 4
describes the data. Section 5 presents the methodology. Section 6 discusses the
main results. Section 7 tests the sensitivity of the results. Section 8 concludes.
2 Conceptual framework
When studying the motives for remitting, the theoretical literature has mainly
focused on altruism (e.g. Barro 1974; Becker 1974) and exchange (e.g. Bernheim
et al. 1985; Cox 1987). Altruistic private transfers take place because the donor
cares about the utility of the recipient. Private transfers motivated by exchange
compensate the recipient for providing services to the donor, such as providing
informal care or obeying parental rules (Juarez 2009). These alternative motives for
remitting can imply drastically different outcomes for public policies that reallocate
income (Cox 1987).
Under the altruistic framework, enrolling in Seguro Popular may crowd-out
private support as recipients enjoy higher disposable incomes. Barro (1974) and
Becker (1974) argue that if households are linked through extensive networks, then
changes in private inter-household transfers could completely neutralise the effects
of public income redistribution programs. This result arises because in the altruistic
model, conditional on remitting, an increase in the recipient’s income together with
an equal decrease in the donor’s income unambiguously causes a decrease in the
same amount in the transfer paid to the recipient. Moreover, an increase in the
recipient’s income keeping the donor’s income constant would also cause a decrease
in private transfers but to a lesser degree (Juarez 2009).
If private transfers are not motivated by altruism, but instead are part of an
explicit exchange of services between recipients and donors, crowding-out may not
occur. The reasoning is that an increase in the recipient’s income would decrease
her or his supply of services and generate an upward movement along the donor’s
demand, raising the implicit price of services and decreasing the quantity (Juarez
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2009). Consequently, the impact of a direct or indirect public transfer on the amount
of private transfers received depends on the elasticity of the donor’s demand for the
services provided by the recipient. In the case where demand is inelastic, which may
arise because the services provided are not easily substituted, the amount of private
transfers received would increase along with income, reinforcing the effects of the
policy (Bernheim et al. 1985; Cox 1987).
Other motives for remitting include a longing to secure access to family
resources such as an inheritance (see, e.g. Bernheim et al. 1985; Lucas and Stark
1985), or the desire to invest in physical or financial assets to self-insure or to earn
higher economic returns (see, e.g. Durand et al. 1996). On the other hand, private
transfers may also be a product of informal risk-sharing agreements between donors
and recipients (see, e.g. Rosenzweig 1988). If private transfers are sent for risk-
sharing purposes, enrolling in Seguro Popular might have an effect on them since
the program provides protection against some of the financial costs associated with
ill health. Finally, people may remit simply because the mere act of giving provides
them utility or to comply with social norms (Jensen 2003). Under some of these
motives, private transfers might not be displaced by increases in the recipient’s
disposable income.
3 Background
3.1 Social security system and health insurance in Mexico
Among the events that helped shape Mexico’s health care system was the creation
of the Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social (IMSS, Mexican Social Security
Institute) in 1943. The IMSS grouped together the pre-existing union-based and
industry-based coverage schemes that offered health services for registered private
sector workers (OECD 2005). Subsequently, the Instituto de Seguridad y Servicios
Sociales de los Trabajadores del Estado (ISSSTE, Institute of Security and Social
Services for State Workers) was created for registered public sector workers in
1960.5 While IMSS and ISSSTE were created for registered workers, the Secretarı´a
de Salubridad y Asistencia (SSA, Ministry of Health and Welfare) was created in
1943 to serve the uninsured population outside of the formal sector. This system left
workers without formal salaried contracts (i.e. the self-employed, urban informal
sector workers, the rural population, the unemployed, and those out of the labour
force) and their families generally without health insurance and dependent of the
services provided by the SSA (OECD 2005).
Consequently, access to health care in Mexico has been historically linked to
work status. Formal sector workers and their families, through social security
institutions such as IMSS or ISSSTE, have the right to health services and a range of
prescription drugs, and are entitled to a spectrum of benefits including day care,
5 A number of systems were also created to provide health insurance to specific industry groups such as
workers of Mexico’s oil state enterprise PEMEX in 1942 or to armed and naval forces personnel, i.e.
citizens enrolled in SEDENA or SEMAR.
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maternity leave, work-risk and retirement pensions, and housing loans, among
others.
Since the role of the SSA was of social assistance, there was no explicit package
of health benefits that the uninsured population was entitled to. In practice, the
services provided by the SSA were limited by health budget allocations and the
availability of health facilities and medical personnel (Bonilla-Chacı´n and Aguilera
2013). As a result, the services provided by the SSA were described as limited,
frequently unavailable, and often requiring out-of-pocket expenditures (Lakin
2010).
While the health insurance schemes provided by social security institutions were
financed by a tripartite arrangement derived from federal government, employer and
employee contributions, the SSA was underfunded as it was financed through a
combination of federal and state resources.6 Due in part to the differences in their
financing schemes, public health expenditures for individuals covered by social
security institutions were twice as high as the expenditures for the uninsured (OECD
2005). These differences led to a lower quality in the health care services provided
by the SSA compared to social security institutions.
By 2000, according to census data, 33.0 % of Mexico’s 97 million residents were
covered by IMSS, 6.0 % were covered by ISSSTE and 2.2 % were covered by
another public or private health insurer. The remaining 57.8 % of the population did
not have health coverage and were lacking social protection against the financial
consequences of ill health (Frenk et al. 2006).
3.2 Reform and description of Seguro Popular
In the early 2000s, Mexico implemented a reform to its health system with the intent
of achieving universal basic health coverage. At the centre of this reform was
Seguro Popular, which represented the most ambitious effort to expand basic health
protection since the creation of IMSS (Parker et al. 2010). The program was aimed
at uninsured families not covered by social security institutions or without access to
any other mechanism of social health insurance.
Seguro Popular was established with the objective of promoting the advanced
payment of medical services, encouraging preventing care, and reducing catas-
trophic health expenses among vulnerable households (DOF 2003). The imple-
mentation of Seguro Popular was accompanied by an increase in public health
expenditures. Between 2000 and 2010, the SSA budget increased 142.0 %, the
budget of IMSS grew 42.0 %, and that of ISSSTE grew 103.0 %. In terms of per
capita health expenses, this narrowed the gap between individuals covered by social
security institutions and the uninsured population (Knaul et al. 2012).
Funding for Seguro Popular is multilateral, as it is financed by the federal
government, state governments and beneficiary families. The provision of services
included under Seguro Popular is responsibility of each state’s health service
6 The term ‘‘states’’ is used as shorthand to refer to Mexico’s 31 states and one Federal District, i.e.
Mexico City. Each state is divided into municipios, i.e. municipalities. In 2010, there were 2456
municipalities in Mexico.
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administration (DOF 2002). Moreover, state governments are responsible for the
management of Seguro Popular resources, and they are free to choose the use of the
transfers they receive (Barros 2009).
Seguro Popular offers primary, secondary and more advanced medical interven-
tions, as well as access to medications and laboratory clinical studies, all provided
free-of-charge. These interventions are classified into six general groups (i.e. public
health, general family health and specialty services, dentistry, emergencies,
hospitalisation and general surgery) covering more than 90.0 % of all hospital
interventions. The program also covers 58 interventions contained in the Fondo de
Proteccio´n contra Gastos Catastro´ficos (Protection Fund against Catastrophic
Expenses), which includes treatment for prematurely born babies, childhood
leukaemia, cervical cancer and HIV.
To register, applicants must reside in Mexico, not be entitled to coverage from a
social security institution, present a birth certificate or unique population
registration code, and provide a utility bill. Enrolments are formalised at orientation
modules located in health centres, clinics and hospitals. Affiliation is not
conditioned on health status, pre-existing illness, or co-payments according to the
type of health care.
Seguro Popular has a progressive affiliation fee, which substitutes the payment of
subsequent services. The program is free to families located at the bottom four
deciles of the income distribution. Since the majority of families enrolled in the
program have low-income levels, according to data provided by the Comisio´n
Nacional de Proteccio´n Social en Salud (CNPSS, National Commission on Social
Protection in Health), during the fourth quarter of 2008 Seguro Popular was free to
more than 99.0 % of its beneficiaries.7
To determine whether families are required to pay the affiliation fee, they are
subject to a socioeconomic evaluation. Before being handed an affiliation card, the
state’s health service administration must confirm that the applicant is not registered
in any institution’s social security database (DOF 2002). In practice, however,
applicants are simply asked whether they are affiliated to a social security
institution, where at the time of enrolment this information is not verified (Parker
et al. 2010).
By 2010, the budget for Seguro Popular ascended to 48.8 billion pesos, i.e.
3.9 billion U.S. dollars. At the end of 2002 the number of families enrolled in
Seguro Popular stood at 295,513. By 2007, 7.3 million families and 21.8 million
people were affiliated to the program. By 2012, the number of families and
individuals enrolled in Seguro Popular ascended to 20.2 and 52.9 million,
respectively, from a pool of approximately 60 million potential beneficiaries.
7 Nevertheless, Scott (2006) shows that in 2004 65.0 % of the households affiliated to Seguro Popular
were non-poor. Lakin (2010) states that upon the introduction of Seguro Popular, applicants were
unwilling to pay the program’s affiliation fee. Consequently, to increase participation rates and meet
affiliation targets, state governments misclassified families who were subject to the contributory fee as
being poor. States have high incentives to enrol a large segment of the population in Seguro Popular since
their health service administrations receive federal funds in proportion to the number of families that are
affiliated to the program at the beginning of each year.
Lat Am Econ Rev (2015) 24:7 Page 7 of 34 7
123
3.3 Implementation of Seguro Popular
Given the substantial segment of the population that Seguro Popular aimed to reach,
the program was rolled-out and expanded gradually. Seguro Popular was first put
into effect in 2002 as a pilot program in selected localities in five states, i.e.
Aguascalientes, Campeche, Colima, Jalisco and Tabasco. These localities were
selected based on their social security coverage, their capacity to provide the
program’s services, their urban and semi-urban concentrations, and the existence of
groups already enrolled in assistance programs provided by the federal government
(DOF 2002).
In the program’s initial rules of operation, it was stated that to implement Seguro
Popular, the federal government would subscribe coordination agreements with
participating states. Nevertheless, during 2002 and 2003 a number of states started
implementing Seguro Popular without having signed a formal agreement. This was
possible before 2004 if the municipal government agreed to offer the program
(Bosch and Campos-Va´zquez 2014). Furthermore, the program’s rules of operation
established that the future selection of states and regions into Seguro Popular would
be based on their proportion and number of uninsured people in the bottom six
deciles of the income distribution, the incidence and prevalence of diseases, the
existence of the health facilities required to offer the services covered under Seguro
Popular, the potential demand for the program’s health insurance scheme, and per
capita federal contributions (DOF 2002).
In 2003, Seguro Popular was formally established as the Sistema de Proteccio´n
Social en Salud (Social Protection System in Health). The program’s rules of
operation were modified where it was stated that Seguro Popular would gradually
expand throughout Mexico according to resource availability (DOF 2003).
Furthermore, it was specified that the expansion of Seguro Popular would be
prioritised in localities according to the set of criteria defined in DOF (2002), while
taking into account the explicit request of state authorities to enrol in the program
(DOF 2003). At the end of 2004, 30 out of 32 states had signed the coordination
agreement with the federal government formalising their participation in Seguro
Popular. The remaining two states, i.e. Durango and Mexico City, signed the
agreements in 2005.
Additionally, a number of different factors played a role in Seguro Popular’s roll-
out process. Dı´az-Cayeros et al. (2006) argue that political reasons were an
important element during the expansion of Seguro Popular. Barros (2009) also
shows that political factors affected the program’s expansion and claims that
because of logistical and political factors that influenced the phase-in process, the
size of the program supply was not related to initial levels of economic development
or health requirements across states. Bosch and Campos-Va´zquez (2014) find that
municipalities with larger populations and those located in smaller states joined
Seguro Popular at earlier stages. The authors also observe that the implementation
date of Seguro Popular and the political affiliation of state governors in post-pilot
municipalities are correlated. Nevertheless, in general the scholars do not find
evidence towards targeting of Seguro Popular in specific municipalities, since
covariates associated with social security coverage, income and industrial structure
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are not significant in predicating the date of entry into the program. Finally, Aterido
et al. (2011) and Azuara and Marinescu (2013) show that levels of informality in the
labour market prior to Seguro Popular being introduced were not correlated with the
program’s entry date. In general, these studies conclude that the introduction of
Seguro Popular was close to random and rely on the variation in the program’s
expansion or implementation date to identify its effects (Bosch et al. 2012).
4 Data
4.1 Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares
To study the effect of Seguro Popular on private transfers, the Encuesta Nacional de
Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares (ENIGH, National Household Income and
Expenditure Survey) is used. The ENIGH is a nationally representative cross-
sectional household survey carried out by Mexico’s national statistical agency.
The ENIGH captures individual-level information on each household member’s
socioeconomic characteristics and different sources of income, including interna-
tional and domestic private transfers. Nonetheless, the survey does not include
information on the characteristics or locality of donors. All net income flows
received by the respondent over the previous 6 months are registered. At the
household level, the ENIGH captures expenditure data for up to the previous
6 months. All income and expenditure data are self-reported. The study uses the
2000, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2008, 2010 and 2012 editions of the ENIGH, which allows
examining the impact of Seguro Popular as the program grew larger.8 The sample
used is limited to economically inactive households and the uninsured, i.e.
households not covered by a social security institution and who are, therefore,
eligible for Seguro Popular.
4.2 Expansion of Seguro Popular
To calculate the expansion of Seguro Popular, a similar strategy to the one put
forward by Grogger et al. (2011) is used. First, administrative data provided by the
CNPSS on the number of individuals affiliated to Seguro Popular by state and
quarter were collected. Subsequently, this information was converted into coverage
rates by dividing it by quarterly estimates of the number of individuals eligible for
Seguro Popular in each state. Data on the number of eligible or uninsured
individuals were drawn from the Encuesta Nacional de Empleo (ENE, National
Employment Survey) and from the Encuesta Nacional de Ocupacio´n y Empleo
(ENOE, National Occupation and Employment Survey). Coverage rates were
constructed for 2004, 2005, 2006, 2008, 2010 and 2012.
8 The 2002 edition of the ENIGH is excluded from the study since there is little information regarding
Seguro Popular’s rules of operation and coverage during its pilot period (Barros 2009). Furthermore,
administrative data on the program’s coverage was only provided for the fourth quarter of 2002 onwards.
Thus, it is not clear what Seguro Popular’s coverage was when the ENIGH 2002 was collected between
August and November 2002.
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Although Seguro Popular started in 2002, the program’s initial expansion was
low, since at the end of 2003 the average coverage rate within each state stood at
8.0 %. Nevertheless, Seguro Popular rapidly expanded in the following years, where
the program’s coverage increased to 33.4 % in 2006, 57.5 % in 2009, and 82.5 % in
2012. Additionally, states were introduced to Seguro Popular at different periods,
where the program grew at different rates within each state. For example, while at
the end of 2002 Colima had a coverage rate of 57.3 %, during the same period 12
states had a coverage rate of zero. Finally, while in 2004 Nuevo Leon and Zacatecas
had similar coverage rates of 6.7 and 7.1 %, respectively, by 2010 these figures had
grown and diverged to 62.6 and 81.3 %, respectively.
5 Methodology
To examine whether Seguro Popular crowds-out private transfers among eligible
households, the program’s expansion throughout Mexico is exploited. Seguro
Popular was introduced at different points and with different coverage rates between
states, as the program’s availability and the share of eligible individuals covered by
Seguro Popular varied between regions.
The variation in the expansion of Seguro Popular has been widely used (e.g.
Barros 2009; Aterido et al. 2011; Grogger et al. 2011; Azuara and Marinescu 2013;
Bosch and Campos-Va´zquez 2014). To make use of this variation over time and
space, I put forward a strategy similar to Grogger et al. (2011) and estimate the
following model:
yhst ¼ cSPst þ XhstbþWmthþ Zstkþ dt þ lsþ 2hst ð1Þ
where yhst denotes the amount of total, international or domestic private transfers
received by household h in state s in year t; SPst represents the Seguro Popular
coverage rate in state s in year t; Xhst denotes a vector of household level charac-
teristics that may affect private transfer receipt; Wmt and Zst represent vectors of
municipality and state-level variables, respectively; dt represents a time period
dummy which helps control for national trends in private transfer receipt; ls denotes
state fixed effects that capture time-invariant characteristics which may affect pri-
vate transfer receipt and the availability or scope of Seguro Popular coverage in the
state; and 2hst is a random error term assumed to be uncorrelated with SPst, Xhst,Wmt
and Zst.
9
To analyse the impact of Seguro Popular on the amount of private transfers
received, i.e. the intensive margin, Eq. (1) is estimated using ordinary least squares
(OLS). When studying the effect of Seguro Popular on the probability of receiving
private transfers, i.e. the extensive margin, Eq. (1) is estimated using OLS as a
linear probability model (LPM). In the latter case, yhst represents a binary variable
that takes the value of one if household h receives a positive amount of private
transfers or zero otherwise. Both models include as covariates the Seguro Popular
9 Various regressions presented in Sects. 6 and 7 include lm, which denotes municipality fixed effects, in
place of ls.
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coverage rate at the state level; the household head’s age, years of schooling and
gender; the number of household members under age 12; the number of household
members age 65 and older; indicator variables for low-quality roofs, floors, and
walls in the household; a dichotomous variable denoting whether the household is
located in a rural locality; and a set of state or municipality and year dummy
variables. Municipality-level controls introduced in Eq. (1) include government
revenue, number of housing credits granted and number of workers affiliated to
IMSS. State-level variables include the state population and binary variables
indicating the political affiliation of the Governor.10 Equation (1) also includes an
indicator variable denoting whether any of the household’s members receives a
scholarship or transfer from Prospera. Prospera is a poverty reduction cash transfer
program with education and health components, where households receive transfers
conditional on sending their children to school and visiting health clinics.11
Equation (1) is estimated separately for total, international and domestic private
transfers.12 Standard errors are clustered by state to account for possible correlation
among households in some unknown way.13
6 Results
6.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 displays the means of selected variables of the uninsured households
included in the study. It can be seen that in 2000, 19.4 % of households received
private transfers. By 2006 this figure had risen to 25.6 %, but by 2012 it had
declined to 25.0 %. Disaggregating total private transfers, it can be seen that during
these three periods the percentage of households receiving domestic private
transfers increased from 14.1 % in 2000, to 18.1 % in 2006, and 19.7 % in 2012. On
the other hand, the number of households receiving international private transfers
increased from 6.2 % in 2000 to 8.9 % in 2006. Nonetheless, this figure dropped to
6.6 % in 2012. Concerning the amount of private transfers received, a similar but
10 Information on the political affiliation of state Governors was taken from the CIDAC electoral data
base. See http://www.cidac.org/eng/Electoral_Database.php.
11 Beneficiaries of Prospera are also eligible for Seguro Popular. The original Prospera program included
a health component which covered 13 medical interventions. Frenk et al. (2006) argue that while Prospera
proved to be a valuable instrument in reducing poverty and improving health levels, a significant
proportion of the cash transfers received by affiliated families were used to finance medical care not
included in the program´s catalogue of interventions.
12 Distinguish between international and domestic private transfers is important since they may be
crowded-out to different degrees as a result of differences in donor characteristics, motivation, or
information about the program (Amuedo-Dorantes and Juarez 2015).
13 While some studies exploit the municipality level variation in the availability of Seguro Popular, this
study mainly focuses on the program’s expansion at the state level. Obtaining the coverage ratio of
Seguro Popular at the municipality level is problematic because information on the number of individuals
eligible for Seguro Popular at the municipality level can only be obtained from either the 2000 and 2010
censuses or the 2005 population count. Nevertheless, Sect. 7.3 exploits the municipality level variation of
Seguro Popular using the program’s availability instead of its coverage rate.
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more pronounced pattern is detected. In 2000, the average amount of private
transfers received stood at 387.9 pesos per month. By 2006, this figure had
increased to 569.5, but by 2012 it had declined to 264.2 pesos per month.
Distinguishing between the amount of international and domestic private transfers
received, it is observed that they both followed a similar pattern to that of total
private transfers.
With respect to other variables, it is observed that while household income
increased by 21.3 % between 2000 and 2006, it encountered a sharp decline
between 2006 and 2012 falling by 29.2 %. Household expenditures faced a similar
pattern increasing by 27.2 % between 2000 and 2006, and subsequently declining
by 30.0 % between 2006 and 2012. As a result, during the period of study, the
average household included in the sample went from being a net saver to a net
debtor. On the other hand, household health expenditures, which stood at 194.8
pesos per month in 2000, increased to 264.5 in 2006, but decreased to 122.1 pesos
per month in 2012. Nevertheless, looking at the raw data it is not possible to
identify how much of this decline is due to a reduction in household income or is
a result of the implementation of Seguro Popular. Concerning the socio-
demographic variables included in the table, it is noteworthy to mention that
the proportion of households located in rural areas varies significantly between
years. This variation in the sampling likely affects other variables such as the
average years of schooling of the household head, and highlights the importance
of controlling for additional factors when performing the econometric analysis.
Finally, looking at the Seguro Popular coverage rate by state, in 2006 an average
of 33.4 % of the households in each state were enrolled in the program. By 2012,
the coverage rate had grown to 82.5 %.
6.2 Does Seguro Popular crowd-out private transfers?
Results of the effect of Seguro Popular on private transfers based on Eq. (1) are
presented in Table 2.14 In all columns, the first row shows the coefficient of the
Seguro Popular (SP) coverage rate at the state level. It can be seen in column (1)
that Seguro Popular had a negative but not statistically significant effect on the
amount of private transfers received. Under the preferred specification presented in
column (2), which includes a full set of controls as well as municipality fixed
effects, it is estimated that Seguro Popular reduced on average the monthly amount
of private transfers received by 50.86 pesos. While the coefficients are negative,
since they are not statistically significant, it is not possible to state that the
implementation of Seguro Popular affected the amount of private transfers
received.15 Focusing on other variables, it is observed that male-headed households
14 The validity of the identification strategy used in this study is examined in the Appendix, i.e. the
exogeneity of Seguro Popular’s implementation across regions.
15 On the other hand, when Eq. (1) is estimated using health expenditures as the dependent variable, the
effect of Seguro Popular is that the program reduced health expenditures by 92.03 pesos per month. This
estimation includes a full set of controls as well as municipality fixed effects and is statistically significant
at the 10.0 % level. Moreover, this result is always significant and is relatively consistent across different
specifications. See Table 9 in the Appendix.
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receive a lower amount of private transfers than female-headed households.
Moreover, residing in a household located in a rural locality is positively and
statistically significantly associated with the amount of private transfers received.
Additional variables which influence the amount of private transfers received
include indicators of the quality of the household and the number of years of
schooling of the household head, which are positively associated with the outcome
of interest; and the age of the household head, which is negatively associated with
the dependent variable.
Table 2 also presents results where the relationship between Seguro Popular and
the likelihood of receiving private transfers is analysed. It is observed in column (3)
that the relationship between Seguro Popular and the probability of receiving private
transfers is negative and statistically significant. Column (4) shows that when a full
set of controls are introduced, including municipality fixed effects, the estimated
effect of Seguro Popular is that a 1.0 % increase in its coverage rate reduced the
probability of receiving private transfers by 0.0555 % points, where this coefficient
is significant at the 10.0 % level. Additionally, since the crowding-out effect is only
observed at the extensive margin, it is possible to quantify this estimate in pesos.
This is done by multiplying the effect reported in column (4) by the mean amount of
private transfers received by uninsured households prior to the program’s
introduction. Since the mean amount of private transfers received by households
in 2000 was 387.9 pesos per month, multiplying this amount by the estimated
coefficient of -0.0555 produces a reduction of 21.5 pesos per month, which is equal
to 23.3 % of the estimated effect of Seguro Popular on health expenditures.
Concerning the other variables, male-headed households have a lower probability of
receiving private transfers than female-headed households. Moreover, households
located in rural localities have a higher likelihood of receiving private transfers than
those located in urban settings. Further variables which affect the probability of
receiving private transfers include indicators of the quality of the household, the age
of the household head, and the number of household residents over 65, all of which
are positively associated with the probability of receiving private transfers; and
being enrolled in Prospera, which is negatively associated with the dependent
variable.16
To study whether the previous findings are driven by private transfers originating
from Mexico or abroad, Table 3 presents estimations where private transfers are
classified as international or domestic according to the sender’s country of
residence. It is observed that the introduction of Seguro Popular did not have a
statistically significant effect on either the amount of international private transfers
received or on the probability of receiving them. In fact, when a full set of control
are added the coefficient becomes positive although not significant. Focusing on
domestic private transfers, it can be seen that under all the different specifications
the relationship between Seguro Popular and the amount of domestic private
transfers received is negative. When a full set of controls are introduced, including
municipality fixed effects, it is estimated that the program reduced the amount of
16 Table 10 in the Appendix allows for a more flexible specification of Eq. (1), where the program’s
effects are assumed to differ by year.
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domestic private transfers received by 72.48 pesos per month. Nonetheless, this
coefficient is not significant. Turning our attention to the probability of receiving
private transfers, when a full set of controls are included, the estimated effect of
Seguro Popular is that it reduced the likelihood of receiving domestic private
transfers by 6.25 percentage points, where this coefficient is statistically significant
at the 10.0 % level. These results suggest that the findings presented in Table 2 are
driven by domestic private transfers, since Seguro Popular does not have an effect
on international private transfers at either the intensive or extensive margins. The
previous findings may arise because most senders located within Mexico are aware
of Seguro Popular and, therefore, changed their remitting behaviour upon the
program’s introduction. This is likely to be case since the program was widely
publicised by the federal government. On the other hand, a large number of senders
located in foreign countries may not be aware of the program and consequently did
not alter their remitting behaviour. Alternatively, domestic and international donors
may have different motives for remitting and thus reacted differently upon the
implementation of Seguro Popular.17
7 Sensitivity checks
7.1 Tobit and logit models
This section examines the sensitivity of the results to the use of a tobit model when
analysing the effect of Seguro Popular on the amount of private transfers received,
and to the use of a logit specification when studying its impact on the likelihood of
receiving private transfers. Tobit estimations presented in Table 4 columns (1) and
(2) show that Seguro Popular had a negative and statistically significant negative
effect on the amount of private transfers received. This finding differs from the OLS
results, where although it was observed that the program had a negative impact on
the amount of private transfers received, the effect was not statistically significant.
Focusing on the extensive margin, logit estimations presented in column (4) show
that a 1.0 % increase in Seguro Popular’s coverage rate reduced the probability of
receiving private transfers by 0.0654 % points. This coefficient is statistically
significant at the 10.0 % level, and larger than the one obtained from the LPM
estimations presented in Table 2.
7.2 Different subsamples
To further analyse the sensitivity of the results, Table 5 presents estimations of
Eq. (1) when focusing on different population groups or when the ENIGH’s survey
weights are used. Panel A presents the results obtained in Table 2, so that
17 This result is similar to that obtained by Amuedo-Dorantes and Juarez (2015), who analyse whether
the 70 y Ma´s program for the rural elderly in Mexico crowded-out private transfers. In their study, the
scholars observe a crowding-out effect at the extensive margin but not at the intensive margin. Moreover,
their results are largely driven by a reduction in the likelihood of receiving domestic private transfers.
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comparisons with the study’s main findings can be more easily made. Panels B to G
report the different sensitivity checks.
Panel B shows that Seguro Popular had different effects which varied according
to the gender of the household head. The program had a stronger impact in female-
headed households at both the intensive and extensive margins. Nonetheless, when a
full set of controls are included, due to the large standard errors, the estimated
coefficients are generally not significant. It is only in column (3), when estimating
the program’s effect on the probability of receiving private transfers for women and
when state fixed effects are included, that a negative and significant effect of 11.6 %
points is observed.
Panel C analyses the effect of Seguro Popular in urban and rural localities. These
coefficients are quite similar to one another and to the one displayed in Panel A.
Moreover, even though the coefficients are not statistically significant, it can be seen
in column (2) that when a full set of controls are added, the program’s effect is
larger in urban settings. This result may be related to the finding presented in
Grogger et al. (2011), where the authors state that the program’s impact is stronger
in urban localities, since health centres and hospitals located in cities are better
equipped and generally offer all of the interventions covered under Seguro Popular.
On the other hand, health facilities located in rural localities are frequently limited
in the amount of the services they provide. Consequently, the impact of Seguro
Popular on health expenditures tends to be lower in rural localities. Nevertheless,
column (4) shows that the program’s effect on the likelihood of receiving private
transfers, although not significant, is larger in absolute value in rural areas.
Panel D differentiates between low- and high-income households. The program’s
effect is relatively stable throughout the income distribution, where the effect of
Seguro Popular at both the intensive and extensive margins is similar for both
groups. Moreover, these effects closely resemble those presented in Panel A, where
their weaker significance is partly driven by their smaller sample sizes.18
Panel E separates households according to whether they incur in high- or low-
health expenditures. The program’s effect is much stronger in low-health
expenditure households. When focusing on the effect of Seguro Popular on the
amount of private transfers received, it is observed that the estimated coefficients
are negative and significant in low-health expenditure households. Moreover, it can
be seen in column (2) that when a full set of controls are included, the program’s
effect rises to 222.3 pesos per month. For high-health expenditure households, the
coefficients are not significant. Focusing on the extensive margin, column (4) shows
that in low-health expenditure households the introduction of Seguro Popular
reduced the likelihood of receiving private transfers by 7.62 percentage points,
where this coefficient is statistically significant at the 10.0 % level. In high-health
expenditure households, it is estimated that a 1.0 % increase in the program’s
18 Since the division of low and high-income households according to whether they are below or above
the median may seem arbitrary, estimations were also performed where households were classified
depending on whether they fall below or above the mean. Households were also grouped by quartiles,
where a comparison was made between those located at the lowest and highest quartiles. The results
presented in Panel D in Table 5 are robust to these different specifications.
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coverage reduced the probability of receiving private transfers by 0.0273 percentage
points. Nonetheless, this coefficient is not significant.
Panel F makes use of the household weights included in the ENIGH. The results
show that, when household weights are used, the impact of Seguro Popular on the
amount of private transfers received is generally negative and not statistically
significant. Concerning the program’s impact on the likelihood of receiving private
transfers, it can be seen in columns (3) and (4) that when a full set of controls are
included, although negative, neither of the coefficients are significant.
Finally, Panel G focuses on households that report receiving a positive amount of
private transfers. When state fixed effects are used along with a full set of controls,
it is estimated that Seguro Popular reduced private transfers by 100.9 pesos per
month. When municipality fixed effects are used, the effect of Seguro Popular is
limited to an increase of private transfer income of 126.1 pesos per month.
Nevertheless, neither of these two coefficients are statistically significant. These
results offer additional evidence that the introduction of Seguro Popular did not
affect the amount of private transfers received.19
7.3 Municipality-level variation
This section exploits the municipality-level variation in the availability of Seguro
Popular. Defining the availability of Seguro Popular in each municipality involves
outlining an arbitrary threshold, since there is no official record of when the
program’s services were initially offered in each municipality.20 In this study, a
municipality is considered as having direct access to Seguro Popular when in its first
observed in any given period that ten or more of its households are affiliated to the
program.
Table 6 presents results of Eq. (1) at both the intensive and extensive margins,
where the availability of Seguro Popular at the municipality level is introduced as a
binary variable in place of the program’s coverage rate at the state level. Panel A
19 Since the introduction of Seguro Popular partially crowded-out private transfers and the program
reduced health expenditures by an even larger amount, the matter of how households used their additional
income derived from being affiliated to the program was also examined. Equation (1) was estimated with
a full set of controls with the dependent variable being household savings or a variety of expenditure
categories such as food, clothing, housing, transportation or education. In results not presented, the
estimated equations show that the introduction of Seguro Popular did not affect household savings,
suggesting that the additional resources were likely used for consumption purposes. The different
expenditure categories were also unaffected by the program’s introduction. These results are likely to
arise because health expenditures constitute a very small fraction of total household expenses. Thus, even
if Seguro Popular reduced health expenditures, its effect may not be large enough to influence household
expenses in other categories. Nonetheless, this result may also be a product of measurement error which is
a common issue when working with expenditure data.
20 In each state where Seguro Popular was introduced, it was up to the local government to undertake the
actions required to identify beneficiary groups, their affiliation and the programs diffusion within their
state (DOF 2002). Thus, the decision of which municipalities were affiliated first was based on
agreements with local governments, where each state decided to implement Seguro Popular according to
its own goals, while generally satisfying the rules of operation of the program (Bosch and Campos-
Va´zquez 2014). Moreover, the extent of Seguro Popular’s coverage within each municipality was decided
by the municipal governments and was based on numerous factors including the availability of resources
related to health infrastructure and health personnel.
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includes all households in the sample. Panels B through E divide the sample by
quartiles according to the household’s position in the income distribution.21
Column (1) of Panel A shows that when a full set of controls are introduced jointly
with state fixed effects, the negative effect of Seguro Popular on the amount of
private transfers received stands at 28.05 pesos per month, where this effect is not
statistically significant. When municipality fixed effects are used as in columns (2),
this effect becomes positive but remains non-significant. Focusing on the extensive
margin, it is observed in column (4) that, when a full set of controls is included along
with municipality fixed effects, the program reduced the likelihood of receiving
private transfers by 1.45 percentage points, where this result is statistically significant
at the 10.0 % level. Consequently, an analysis that uses the program’s availability at
the municipality level provides further evidence that Seguro Popular did not crowd-
out private transfers at the intensive margin. On the other hand, it supports the finding
that the program had weak but statistically significant effect at the extensive margin.
Focusing on households located at different parts of the income distribution,
Panel B shows that the program’s effect was stronger among households located in
the bottom quartile. Column (1) shows that at the intensive margin, when a full set
of controls are introduced including state fixed effects, it is estimated that Seguro
Popular reduced the amount of private transfers received by 46.57 pesos per month,
where this coefficient is statistically significant at the 1.0 % level. Moreover, when
municipality fixed effects are used, it is observed in column (2) that the program
reduced private transfers by 37.80 pesos per month, where this coefficient is
significant at the 5.0 % level. At the intensive margin, similar results are found.
Column (3) shows that, when a full set of controls are used including state fixed
effects, it is estimated that the program reduced the likelihood of receiving private
transfers by 2.49 % points. When municipality fixed effects are incorporated, it can
be seen in column (4) that Seguro Popular reduced the likelihood of receiving
private transfers by 3.58 % points, where this coefficient is significant at the 5.0 %
level. Finally, regarding the households located in the top three quartiles of the
income distribution, Panels C, D and E show that in general Seguro Popular did not
affect private transfers at either the intensive or extensive margins. The program’s
effect might be larger among low-income households given that they are actually
more likely to be enrolled in Seguro Popular relative to higher income households.
Furthermore, the fact that the program crowds-out private support among low-
income households but not among those located higher in the income distribution
may be a result of differences in the motives for remitting among donors depending
on the receiving household’s level of income.
21 While generally consistent, when using Seguro Popular’s availability at the municipality level as the
main explanatory variable, the magnitude of the estimated coefficients is dependent on which threshold is
used to denote when the program first became available in each municipality. Furthermore, using the
program’s availability instead of its coverage rate conceals substantial information, particularly
considering that the study covers a period of both low and high Seguro Popular coverage. Due to these
shortcomings, estimations when using the program’s state coverage rate instead of its municipality
availability are presented as the main results.
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7.4 Donors
Since the ENIGH collects information on household expenditures, it is possible to
focus on donors instead of recipients and examine the effect of Seguro Popular on
the amount of private transfers sent and on the probability of remitting a positive
amount.22 To calculate the effect of Seguro Popular on donors, Eq. (1) is again
estimated where the dependent variable is either the monthly amount of private
transfers sent or a dichotomous variable that takes the value of one if the household
remitted a positive amount during the previous 6 months or zero otherwise.
Additionally, to minimise unobserved heterogeneity that may affect remitting
behaviour, households are classified according to whether they are eligible or
ineligible for Seguro Popular.
Table 7 shows that among households eligible for Seguro Popular, when a full set
of controls are introduced along with state fixed effects, it is estimated that the
program increased the amount of private transfers sent by 10.92 pesos per month,
where this effect is not statistically significant. When municipality fixed effects are
included, the effect increases to 18.48 pesos per month but is once again non-
significant. With respect to the program’s effect on the probability of remitting, a
similar relationship is observed. Whether state- or municipality fixed effects are
included along with a full set of controls, it is estimated that Seguro Popular
increased the probability of remitting, where this effect is never statistically
significant.
Concerning how the introduction of Seguro Popular affected the remitting
behaviour of households that were not eligible for the program, a different pattern is
observed. Column (3) shows that, when state fixed effects are used, it is estimated
that Seguro Popular reduced the amount of private transfers sent by 149.7 pesos per
month, where this coefficient is significant at the 10.0 % level. When municipality
fixed effects are incorporated jointly with a full set of controls, it is estimated that
the program’s introduction reduced the amount of private transfers sent by 157.6
pesos per month, where this effect is once again significant at the 10.0 % level. With
respect to the probability of remitting, it is observed that Seguro Popular reduced the
probability of remitting among ineligible households between 2.93 and 4.38 %
points. Nevertheless, these coefficients are not statistically significant.
In summary, the results show that while the introduction of Seguro Popular did not
affect the remitting behaviour of households that were eligible for the program, it did
affect the remitting behaviour of households that were not eligible to enrol in Seguro
Popular. This may be driven by the fact that households covered by social security
institutions are much more likely to remit that those who are uninsured. Specifically,
prior to the program’s introduction in 2000, approximately 18.2 % of insured
households remitted compared to 10.5 % among uninsured households. Moreover,
among households that remitted a positive amount, insured households donated on
average 425.2 pesos per month compared to 281.4 among uninsured households. On
22 While it is likely that the majority of the private transfers sent by the donors included in the ENIGH
are directed towards families residing within Mexico, the survey does not contain information on the
characteristics of beneficiary households.
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the other hand, it may be that households have different motives for remitting
depending on whether they have access to a social security institution or not.
8 Conclusions
This study examined the empirical question of whether the implementation of
Seguro Popular affected the amount of private transfers received and the likelihood
of receiving private transfers among Mexico’s uninsured households. The effects of
Seguro Popular were identified using the spatial variation in the program’s coverage
induced by its sequential roll-out throughout Mexico.
Based on multiple waves of the ENIGH, the results show that among households
eligible for the program Seguro Popular had no effect on the amount of private
transfers received. This may be due to the fact that prior to the program’s
implementation in 2000, health expenditures only accounted for 2.6 % of total
household expenditures. On the other hand, the implementation of Seguro Popular
reduced on average a household’s probability of receiving private transfers by 5.55
percentage points, a 28.6 % reduction with respect to the 0.194 probability that
uninsured households had of receiving private transfers prior to the program’s
introduction in 2000. This estimate is driven by domestic private transfers, since
international private transfers were not affected by the program’s implementation at
either the intensive or extensive margins. Seguro Popular’s negative effect on the
likelihood of receiving private transfers is robust to the use of the program’s state-
level expansion or municipality-level availability.
The fact that Seguro Popular had a clear social welfare improving effect has been
well documented, since the program has provided millions of Mexicans access to
health care. Nonetheless, the finding that an unintended consequence of Seguro
Popular is that it partially crowds-out private support highlights the importance of
looking at unexpected outcomes when analysing public policies, since the presence
of crowding-out effects has important implications for the effectiveness of
redistributive policies. The crowding-out effect suggests that the net effect of
Seguro Popular is smaller than when just analysing its impact on health
expenditures or health outcomes. Consequently, an evaluation of the effects of
Seguro Popular should take into account possible changes in private behaviour.
Failure to do so may overstate the program’s potential benefits or distributional
impacts.
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author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were
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This section examines if the identification strategy used in this study is valid. The
test is relevant because using the expansion and availability of Seguro Popular as a
source of identification assumes that these two factors are not correlated with the
outcomes of interest. The endogeneity of Seguro Popular is examined by testing
whether the program’s quarter and year of introduction and expansion rates in 2005
and 2010 are predicted by pre-program municipality and state-level characteristics
compiled from Mexico’s 2000 Census.23 The test is performed by estimating the
following model by OLS:
ym ¼ Xmbþ Zsdþ em ð2Þ
where ym denotes either the quarter and year of introduction of Seguro Popular in
municipality m, expressed as an index equal to one beginning in the fourth quarter
of 2002 which increases by one unit each quarter, or is a continuous variable
between zero and one that indicates the proportion of the eligible population
enrolled in Seguro Popular in municipality m in 2005 or 2010. Xm and Zs are vectors
of municipality- and state-level characteristics in 2000, respectively; and em is the
error term.24 The municipality-level covariates included in Eq. (2) are population
size, the share of insured population, the share of urban population, the median
wage, the population’s average years of schooling, the unemployment rate, and
demographic and industry composition shares. The state-level regressors are pop-
ulation size, the political party of the Governor, and state dummies. Equation (2)
also includes the share of households that receive international and domestic private
transfers, the median of international and domestic private transfers received, and
the average number of international migrants per household. The estimations are
performed for all municipalities and for those municipalities included in the
ENIGH.
The endogeneity analysis results are presented in Table 8. In column (1), the
dependent variable is an index denoting the quarter and year of implementation of
Seguro Popular. It can be seen that the municipality’s date of entry into Seguro
Popular is negatively related with its population size and positively related with the
state’s population size. Moreover, the date of entry is positively associated with the
share of the population covered by a social security institution. Additionally, the
23 The analysis performed in this subsection is conducted at the municipality level and not the state level
given that performing it at the state level limits the sample to 32 observations. The small sample size
implies that the estimated regressions would be unlikely to have sufficient power to adequately
distinguish between zero and non-zero coefficients. Nevertheless, the estimation of Eq. (2) was also
performed at the state level, where for all years none of the estimated controls were statistically
significant; except for 2012, where the variable log median of domestic private transfers was significant at
the 10.0 % level. These results are available upon request.
24 A similar analysis is conducted by Azuara and Marinescu (2013) and Bosch and Campos-Va´zquez
(2014), who investigate whether the implementation of Seguro Popular affected participation rates in the
formal-informal labour markets.
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date of entry is negatively related with having a Governor from the PRI party and
with demographic variables pertaining to the share of the population under the age
of 24 and between the ages of 24 and 40. Above all, the municipality’s initial
quarter and year of participation in Seguro Popular is not associated with any of the
study’s main outcomes of interest.
Columns (2) and (3) in Table 8 present regression results where the dependent
variable is the proportion of eligible individuals covered by Seguro Popular at the
municipality level in 2005 and 2010, respectively. It is observed that the expansion
is not related to the municipality’s population size or to the state’s population size.
Although not significant, the negative signs of the state population variable are in
line with the arguments put forward by Dı´az-Cayeros et al. (2006) and Bosch and
Campos-Va´zquez (2014). The scholars claim that prior to the 2006 presidential
election, smaller states were given preference to achieve full coverage so that the
federal government could declare that it had achieved universal coverage in these
states. Municipalities with low median wages also had lower expansion rates in
2010. It could be that poorer municipalities which have lower median wages have a
scarcity of health facilities which are a requirement for implementing Seguro
Popular. Furthermore, the expansion of Seguro Popular in 2005 was slower in states
governed by the PRD left-wing party, the main opposition of the ruling right-wing
PAN party. With respect to the variables of interest, as in column (1), the expansion
of Seguro Popular in 2005 and 2010 is not correlated with the average number of
international migrants per household, the log medians of international or domestic
private transfers, or the shares of the population that receive international or
domestic private transfers.
While the implementation of Seguro Popular was not completely exogenous,
Table 8 does not provide evidence suggesting that the program was targeted in
specific municipalities in relation to the outcomes of interest, since they have no
effect on the date of entry or on the expansion of Seguro Popular.25 In summary, the
results support the identification strategy used in this study. Nevertheless, the fact
that there was no randomisation in the implementation of Seguro Popular implies
that it is not possible to rule out the potential existence of other treats to the
identification of the program’s effects. This represents an important limitation of the
study.
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